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INTRODUCTION
When a dangerously mentally ill person is in need of in-patient
psychiatric hospitalization, the apparatus for involuntary civil
commitment goes into motion. As a result, a mentally ill person can
be confined against his or her will, to remain in the hospital
indefinitely. The mentally ill person’s freedom depends on the
outcome of a single hearing. The civil commitment process raises a
number of legal questions: What are the constitutional protections
against self-incrimination and the right to remain silent? Who
presides over the hearing? Do the rules of evidence apply,
specifically hearsay? Is the burden of proof standard by the
preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing, or beyond a
reasonable doubt? Should the mentally ill person have the right to an
independent evaluation of his or her psychiatric condition to contest
the view of the hospital psychiatrist? Is the adversarial hearing
process best suited to address the need for in-patient hospitalization?
Should legal guardians and those designated as power of attorney be
given the authority to voluntarily admit a patient into a psychiatric
hospital?
This Article will explore the current involuntary civil commitment
process for confining a mentally ill and dangerous person in a
psychiatric hospital. A criminal defendant is often guaranteed greater
protections than a mentally ill person facing involuntary civil
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commitment. As a person’s freedom is at stake, the serious nature of
confinement warrants a critical review of how we address the need for
psychiatric treatment of our dangerously mentally ill.
Part I will examine the government’s power to confine a mentally
ill person and the minimum due process safeguards for involuntary
admission. Part II will explore the applicability of the constitutional
right to remain silent in civil commitment proceedings. Part III will
discuss the authority of mental health professionals to testify at the
civil commitment hearings and consider issues of privileged
communication. Parts IV and V will look at issues pertaining to the
rules of evidence, ranging from the burden of proof to hearsay
evidence as heard by the hearing judge. Parts VI and VII will analyze
respectively the right to an independent psychiatric evaluation and
alternative procedures to resolve the determination of the need for
hospitalization. Part VIII will address the rights of others to consent
to voluntary hospitalization of a mentally ill person, including
guardians, persons with power of attorney, and parents of minor
persons. Part IX will make recommendations for improving the
involuntary civil confinement process.
This Article provides an analysis of the current system and
practical, concrete suggestions for improving the involuntary civil
confinement process through the eyes of the attorney representing
the mentally ill client facing involuntary psychiatric hospitalization.
I. THE GOVERNMENT’S POWER TO CONFINE, MINIMAL DUE
PROCESS PROTECTIONS, AND THE REMAINING VOID OF DUE
PROCESS PROTECTIONS
This section outlines a historical perspective of the civil
commitment process, including the source of the government’s power
to confine mentally ill persons, the minimum due process safeguards
for the procedure, and the voids that still exist in those safeguards.
A. The Government’s Power to Apprehend and Confine a Person
with a Mental Illness
Half a century ago, it was recognized that the current treatment of
persons with mental illness was inhumane and that change was
imperative. State and federal courts, acknowledging that civil
commitment was a significant curtailment of liberty interests,1
1. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967);
Sprecht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
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established procedural limitations to the previously unchallenged
practice of committing mentally ill persons for treatment purposes
under parens patriae powers.2 Following landmark Supreme Court
decisions,3 most states adopted a stricter criterion for civil
commitment requiring, at a minimum, a showing of
“dangerousness.”4
According to the United States Supreme Court, the State has a
legitimate interest under its parens patriae power in providing care to
the mentally ill who are unable to care for themselves.5 In addition,
the Court recognizes the state has the authority under its police
power to protect the community from the dangerously mentally ill.6
The interplay of these two opposing governmental roles presents
conflict when the rights of the involuntarily confined are at stake.
Unfortunately, several decades later attitudes have changed and
the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction, lowering the
threshold.7 State legislatures, with the broad support of the medical
community,8 have moved to expand the definition of
“dangerousness” back to the dark ages prior to the 1960s. Only eight
states still define dangerousness solely as a “danger to self or others.”9
Forty-two states provide criteria broader than dangerousness that
often include either a “grave disability”10 or a “need for treatment”11
provision.

2. R. Michael Bagby & Leslie Atkinson, The Effects of Legislative Reform on
Civil Commitment Admission Rates: A Central Analysis, 6 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 4545–46

(1988).
3. Addington, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975);
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
4. Robert A Brooks, Psychiatrists’ Opinions About Involuntary Civil
Commitment: Results of a National Survey, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 219
(2007).
5. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
6. Id.
7. Donald H. Stone, Confine is Fine: Have The Non-Dangerous Mentally Ill

Lost Their Right to Liberty? An Empirical Study to Unravel the Psychiatrist’s
Crystal Ball, 20 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L., 323, 325 (2012).
8. Brooks, supra note 4.
Treatment Standards, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR.,
9. Improved

http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/solutions/improved-treatment-standards.
10. Id. (stating that grave disability is an additional criterion that allows for
commitment where a mentally ill person is unable to care for their basic needs).
11. Id. (stating that need for treatment provisions are based on either the person’s
inability to provide for needed psychiatric care, inability to make an informed
medical decision, or need for intervention to prevent further psychiatric or emotional
deterioration).
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The regressive trend in civil commitment laws requires scrutiny. In
most cases, criminal defendants, whom the government has authority
to confine via the police power, are afforded greater protections than
mentally ill persons facing involuntary civil commitment.
B.

Minimal Due Process Protections Afforded by the Supreme
Court

The United States Supreme Court articulated in O’Connor v.
Donaldson that the purpose of involuntary hospitalization is
treatment and not mere custodial care or punishment if the patient is
not a danger to himself or others.12 The Court declared that a state
cannot constitutionally confine a non-dangerous individual who is
capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of
willing and responsible family members or friends.13 The Court
specifically held:
A finding of ‘mental illness’ alone cannot justify a State’s locking a
person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple
custodial confinement. Assuming that that term can be given a
reasonably precise content and that the ‘mentally ill’ can be
identified with reasonable accuracy, there is still no constitutional
basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous
to no one and can live safely in freedom.14

Thus, the confinement of a non-dangerous person based upon mental
illness alone is not constitutionally sufficient.15
In the landmark case Addington v. Texas, the Supreme Court
recognized that civil commitment “constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty”16 and that mentally ill individuals facing
involuntary civil commitment can lead to adverse social
consequences.17
The Court noted the very significant impact an
involuntary commitment to a mental hospital would have on the
individual by stating:

12. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 570 (1975). The Court requires that
minimally adequate treatment should be provided.
13. Id. at 576.
14. Id. at 575.
15. Id. The O’Connor Court further noted the “important” nature of its holding
as one “concerning every man’s constitutional right to liberty.” Id. at 573.
16. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967)).
17. Id. at 425–26.
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[I]t is indisputable that involuntary commitment to a mental
hospital . . . can engender adverse social consequences to the
individual. Whether we label this phenomena “stigma” or choose to
call it something else is less important than that we recognize that it
can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the
individual.18

The Court appreciated the individual’s interest in the outcome of a
civil commitment proceeding is of the weight and gravity that due
process requires the state to justify confinement by proof more
substantial than a mere preponderance of the evidence.19 The Court
held that the proper burden of proof at the civil commitment hearing
was a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof,20 although as
will be discussed later, several states laws have applied the more
stringent beyond a reasonable doubt standard.21
Another significant cornerstone of due process protections for
persons facing civil commitment is limiting the length of the stay in
the hospital. In Jackson v. Indiana,22 the Court announced its
prohibition on indefinite confinement, holding that it violates the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process.23 In so holding,
the Court imposed a rule of reasonableness, requiring that without a
finding of dangerousness, one committed through the civil
commitment process could only be held for a reasonable period of
time.24
C.

The Void of Due Process Safeguards in the Civil Commitment
Process: Lessard v. Schmidt

Lessard v. Schmidt, a landmark mental health decision by a lower
federal court, highlighted several due process implications in the
context of civil commitments.25 The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin acknowledged that in civil
commitment proceedings, the same fundamental liberties are at stake

18. Id.
19. Id. at 1810.
20. Id. at 1812.
21. See infra Part V.
22. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)
23. Id. at 731.
24. Id. at 1855.
25. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473
(1974). The Court addressed other issues including timely notice of petition, notice
of right to jury trial, length of detention prior to a hearing, right to counsel, hearsay
evidence, as well as the privilege against self-incrimination.
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as in criminal cases.26 The failure to provide due process safeguards
against unjustified deprivation of liberty in the context of involuntary
civil commitments was of grave concern to the court.27 The
abhorrence to the relaxation of criminal due process standards in the
involuntary civil commitment arena is especially important. The court
was skeptical of lengthy hospitalization that may greatly increase
symptoms of mental illness and make adjustment to society more
difficult.28 It also recognized the enormous and devastating effect on
the individual’s civil rights, as well as the stigma that accompanies any
hospitalization.29 Furthermore, the court had great concerns for the
secondary impacts of civil commitment on the committed individual,
ranging from the loss of basic civil rights to the loss of future
opportunities.30
The Lessard court also recognized other significant due process
rights, ranging from notice of the commencement of proceedings to
the opportunity to be heard at the hearing.31 Although the Lessard
decision did not articulate the precise nature of the hearing, it did
explain that a mentally ill person is entitled to a preliminary hearing
within forty-eight hours of first being detained32 and a full hearing
within ten to fourteen days after their initial detainment.33
Involuntary civil commitment hearings require a determination
that a mentally ill person is a danger to his or her self or others.34 The
Lessard court recognized the difficulty in predicting future conduct
and viewed confinement based on such predictions with suspicion.35
In recognition of this challenge, the Court determined that the state
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all facts necessary to show the
individual is mentally ill and dangerous.36 Civil commitment laws vary
among the states with respect to the burden of proof standard, which
ranges from clear and convincing evidence to the beyond a

26. Id. at 1084.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1087.
29. Id. at 1089. The Court noted the job market is better for ex-felons than expatients. Id.
30. Id. at 1090.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1091.
33. Id. at 1092.
34. See, e.g., N.Y. Ment. Hyg. Law § 9.37(a).
35. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. . at 1093.
36. Id. at 1095.
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reasonable doubt standard.37 In addition, the court announced the
right to counsel for persons facing involuntary civil commitment.38
Lessard’s declaration of due process protections recognizes the
serious implications faced by a person subjected to involuntary civil
commitment. As a result, the civil commitment process became
remarkably similar to a criminal proceeding through considering the
potential loss of liberty as well as the negative impact on one’s
reputation (i.e., “stigma”). The Fifth Amendment’s privilege against
self-incrimination39 afforded in criminal cases40 was also considered in
Lessard in terms of its application to civil commitment proceedings.41
Lessard acknowledged that the availability of the privilege does not
turn upon the type of proceeding but rather upon the nature of the
patient’s statement or admission to hospital or police personnel and
the exposure that it invites.42 The privilege may be claimed in civil or
administrative proceedings if the content of the statement may be
inculpatory.43 The threat of deprivation of liberty, clearly evident in
civil commitment proceedings, was recognized by the court.44
Lessard’s conclusion was to extend the privilege against selfincrimination whenever a person is committed on the basis of his or
her statements to a psychiatrist in the absence of a showing that the
statements were made with “knowledge” that the individual was not
obligated to speak.45
There are other instances where the privilege against selfincrimination may come into play, from the initial detention, which
often involves the police, to the continued confinement or
observation stages46 in which the mentally ill individual will have
frequent conversations with a psychiatrist who may testify at the

37. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126 (beyond a reasonable doubt); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 5011 (clear and convincing evidence); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.
§ 574.034 (clear and convincing evidence); In re Turner, 439 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. 1982)
(clear and convincing evidence); Massachusetts v. Nassar, 406 N.E.2d 1286 (1980)
(beyond a reasonable doubt).
38. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1097.
39. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V.
40. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
41. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1100.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1101. Such is deprivation of liberty if the person is held against his will.
45. Id. at 1101. The psychiatrists should inform the patient that he is going to be
examined with regard to his mental condition and such statements he makes may be
the basis for commitment and that he does not have to speak to the psychiatrist.
46. See, e.g., CODE OF MD. REGULATIONS [hereinafter COMAR] § 10.21.01.07.
Initial confinement is an observation status.
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pending civil commitment hearing. At the hearing itself, there may be
opportunities for the mentally ill person to make statements.47 At all
of these vital stages, the right to the privilege against selfincrimination comes into play. The statements made by an individual
at various stages in the civil commitment process—to police at the
earliest stages, to psychiatrists and other hospital personnel upon
confinement prior to the civil commitment hearing, and, finally, at the
hearing itself—all cast into doubt the actual protection against selfincrimination.
The Lessard court also considered a challenge to the
constitutionality of the civil commitment statute based on the use of
hearsay evidence at the commitment hearing.48 The court appreciated
the standard exclusionary rules forbidding the admission of evidence
in criminal cases and saw no sound policy reasons for admitting
evidence in involuntary civil commitment hearings.49 This strict
adherence to the rules of evidence is applicable to proceedings in
which an individual’s liberty is in jeopardy.50 The Lessard holding
with respect to self-incrimination, as well as hearsay, will be explained
further in analyzing current state civil commitment laws.
The Lessard decision was ultimately overturned on other grounds
and never amounted to binding precedent. However, the court’s
recognition of serious problems regarding the involuntary civil
commitment process in the United States is of extreme importance.
Forty-three years after the Lessard opinion, most of the same serious
problems exist.
The Supreme Court, in Vitek v. Jones, recognized the significant
loss of liberty involved in an involuntary civil commitment.51 Other
courts have attempted to elevate the rights of the involuntarily
committed to that of a criminal defendant. For example, in Terrace v.
Northville, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit announced that
involuntarily committed psychiatric patients have greater rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment than criminals under the Eighth
Amendment and, therefore, a person involuntarily committed should
be entitled to more considerate treatment in conditions of
47. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-12-3.19 (2014).
48. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1102.
49. Id. at 1103.
50. Id. The Lessard Court quotes Justice Brandeis saying, “[e]xperience should
teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government’s purposes
are beneficial . . . the greatest danger to liberty is insidious encroachment by men of
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 479 (1928).
51. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1980).
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confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are
intended as punishment.52
Several courts have discussed the rights of the involuntarily
committed person, equating those rights to that of the criminal
defendant.53 However, the extent to which the privilege against selfincrimination is applicable is far from clear. Courts should continue to
consider the similarities between these two groups and extend the due
process protection even further for the mentally ill person facing
involuntary hospitalization.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT: DOES IT
APPLY TO CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS?
When a mentally ill person is exhibiting dangerous behavior in the
community, police are authorized to detain and transport the
individual to a hospital for an examination.54 At the hospital,
physicians will conduct an examination to determine if the person
poses a danger to him or her self or others as a result of a mental
illness and, if so, would require in-patient psychiatric
hospitalization.55 Once hospitalized in the psychiatric facility, the
mentally ill person will begin receiving mental health treatment for
several days prior to a civil commitment hearing.56 During the period
of time after first being detained, transported, and examined and the
treatment commencing, as many as ten or eleven days may pass.57
This is all time during which the mentally ill individual has the
potential to make statements to the police, family members, and/or
mental health professionals who may repeat such statements at the
civil commitment hearing. These statements may then be used as a
basis for confinement.
What are the rights of the mentally ill person to prevent such selfincriminating statements from being used against him or her to prove

52. Terrance v. Northville Regional Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 28, 34 (6th Cir.
2002). This is based on the notion that criminals are confined for punishment under
the state’s police power, whereas the involuntarily committed are confined for
treatment under the state’s parens patriae role.
53. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Sprecht v. Patterson, 386 U.S.
605 (1967); Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
54. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN., § 10-622(d), § 10-624.
55. See, e.g., id. § 10-616.
56. See, e.g., id. § 10-625.
57. See, e.g., id. § 10-632(b). The hearing shall be conducted within ten days of
initial confinement; in addition, an evaluee may have been detained in an emergency
evaluation for up to thirty hours. See id. § 10-624(b)(4).
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the presence of dangerous behavior? Should the Fifth Amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination, applicable to criminal
proceedings,58 be extended to involuntary civil commitment hearings?
The deprivation of liberty that is present in the criminal context
surely extends to person involuntarily confined against their will in a
psychiatric hospital.
A. Miranda and the Civil Commitment Process
In the context of a custodial police interrogation, Miranda v.
Arizona and its progeny provide that any statement made in such a

context is prohibited from being used against the speaker unless
police provided Miranda warnings.59 In Miranda, the Supreme Court
evaluated the admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant
while in police custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in a significant way.60 When a mentally ill person is acting in a
dangerous way that leads police to believe he or she is in need of
psychiatric hospitalization, the person is then taken into police
custody, transported against his or her will for a psychiatric
evaluation, and is not free to leave.61 During this period of detention,
a mentally ill person may make statements that form the basis of
future police testimony that the person poses a danger to one’s self or
others. Such statements may be incriminating by including admission
of criminal wrongdoing.
The Miranda Court spoke of the police practice of incommunicado
interrogation, which is at odds with one of the United States’ most
cherished principles: that the individual may not be compelled to
incriminate himself.62 Similarly, in the civil commitment setting, the
mentally ill individual is often subject to intimidation and
confinement, which, as in Miranda, is used to subjugate the individual
to the will of his examiner.63 In this context, the examination would

58. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
59. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. When an individual is taken into custody or
deprived of his freedom, Miranda mandates that the individual be warned that he has
the right to remain silent and anything said can be used against him in court, and that
he has the right to be questioned in the presence of an attorney and if he cannot
afford an attorney, one will be appointed to him prior to any questioning. Id.
60. Id. at 445. The Court gave particular note to the fact that the defendant, while
in custody, was cut off from the outside world. The nature of this incommunicado
environment was the Court’s basis for its ultimate finding that custody situations are
inherently coercive.
61. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN., § 10-624.
62. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
63. See id.
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include police, emergency room personnel, and hospital mental
health workers. Individuals confined to inpatient psychiatric hospitals
face greater deprivation of freedom than those who are incarcerated,
as arrestees have diminished liberties but persons civilly committed
are outside of the penal authority.
The Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege extends
outside of criminal court proceedings and recognized that it protects
persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in
any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.64
As Miranda declares, when an individual is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant
way and is then subjected to questioning, the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination is jeopardized.65 The mentally ill person
detained by police and confined in a psychiatric facility too should be
extended the Miranda protections, including being warned prior to
questioning that he has a right to remain silent and anything he says
can be used against him in an involuntary civil commitment hearing.
The Supreme Court has declared that “[t]he loss of liberty produced
by involuntary commitment is more than a loss of freedom from
confinement.”66
The privilege against self-incrimination was expanded in In re
Gault, where the Supreme Court examined the due process rights of
juveniles charged with delinquency.67 The Court recognized that
although the juvenile proceedings were not criminal, the results were
the same and determinations of delinquency could lead to
commitment in a state institution, which is a deprivation of liberty.68
Incarceration against one’s will has occurred, and whether called
criminal or civil, deprivation of liberty has occurred.69 So, in the civil
commitment context, the deprivation of one’s freedom has occurred,
calling for the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
to apply. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in McNeil v.
Patuxent Institution Director, asserted that the Fifth Amendment’s
privilege against self-incrimination was applicable to commitment
proceedings even though they are normally labeled civil

64. Id. at 466.
65. Id. at 478.
66. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980).
67. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
68. Id. at 49; see also French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C 1977).
69. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 50; see also In re Helvenston, 658 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1985).
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proceedings.70 When the state asserts that a mentally ill person poses
a danger to self or others, the state should be required to prove the
need for psychiatric confinement through ways other than the
mentally ill person’s compelled statements. Observations by other
witnesses should form the basis of the state’s case for confinement.
B. State Laws on the Right to Remain Silent in the Civil
Commitment Setting
Several state legislatures have extended the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination beyond the criminal context and into the
civil commitment process.71 For example, in a Pennsylvania hearing
on a petition for court-ordered involuntary treatment, a patient shall
not be called as a witness without his consent.72 Alabama civil
commitment laws also prohibit a patient from being compelled to
testify against his or her self.73 Other states providing for the right to
remain silent in the civil commitment hearing include Alaska,
Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Ohio, South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.74 These states that provide for the privilege against selfincrimination and the right to remain silent recognize the significant
infringement on one’s liberty interest caused by involuntary civil
commitment.
In contrast, several courts addressing the privilege against selfincrimination and its applicability in the civil commitment context

70. McNeil v. Patuxent Institution Director, 407 U.S. 254 (1972); see also Tyars v.
Finner, 518 F. Supp. 502 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113
(D. Haw. 1976); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
71. See ALA. CODE § 22-52-9; ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735; ARK. CODE ANN. § 2047-211; DEL. CODE ANN. tit.16, § 5006; FLA. STAT. ANN. §394.467; HAW. REV. STAT. §
334-60.5; MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-73; MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.335; MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 53-21-115; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30: 4-27.33; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15; 50 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7304; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-12-3.19; WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 71.05.360; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-4; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20; WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 25-10-109.
72. 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7304.
73. ALA. CODE § 22-52-9.
74. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735; ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-211; DEL. CODE
ANN. tit.16, § 5006; FLA. STAT. ANN. §394.467; HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-60.5; MISS.
CODE ANN. § 41-21-73; MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.335; MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-115;
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30: 4-27.33; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 27A-12-3.19; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.360; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-4;
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-109. For state statutes addressing
the privilege against self-incrimination, see Appendix A.
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have held that the privilege does not apply.75 Occasionally, the state
seeking confinement of a person to a psychiatric hospital will attempt
to call the person subject to the involuntary commitment as an
adverse witness to prove the need for involuntary hospitalization. The
California Court of Appeals held that it was permissible for the
hearing court to compel a person facing civil commitment to testify at
the commitment hearing, on the basis that the privilege was not
extended from the criminal context to the civil commitment context.76
In Illinois, however, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that the
involuntary commitment proceedings do not encompass the right
against self-incrimination, permitting one who is subject to such
matters to be called as an adverse witness.77 Moreover, the Supreme
Court of Indiana rejected the civil commitment patient’s right to
remain silent, holding that the privilege against self-incrimination has
no applicability in civil commitment proceedings.78 Kiritsis
acknowledged the resulting deprivation of liberty but recognized that
the legitimate objectives of the statute and interests of the state would
be wholly frustrated were individuals permitted to claim the privilege
in civil commitment proceedings.79 Some courts even attempt to
explain the authority to call the mentally ill person to testify and be
questioned by the judge as analogous to the admissibility of physical
evidence as opposed to testimonial evidence at a criminal trial.80
The Court of Appeals of Oregon in Oregon v. Matthews, although
not finding that due process requires a mentally ill person in a civil
commitment proceeding be afforded the right to remain silent if his
testimony may be used as a basis for confinement, held that one may

75. Conservatorship of Bones, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1010 (1987); People v. Taylor, 618
P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980); Matter of Nolan, 384 N.E.2d 134 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); State ex
rel. Kiritsis v. Marion Prob. Ct., 381 N.E.2d 1245 (Ind. 1978); Matter of Baker, 324
N.W.2d 91(Mich. Ct. App. 1982); In re Field, 412 A.2d 1032 (N.H. 1980); French v.
Blackbum, 428 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Matter of D.J.L., 964 P.2d 983 (Okla.
Civ. App. 1998); Matter of Mathews, 613 P.2d 88 (Or. Ct. App. 1980); In re
Helvenston, 658 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); State v. McCarty, 892 A.2d 250
(Vt. 2006).
76. Conservatorship of Bones, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1010 (1987). The state and federal
constitutions, according to the Court, do not grant the patient a right not to testify.
See also People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).
77. Matter of Nolan, 384 N.E.2d 134 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
78. State ex rel. Kiritsis v. Marion Prob. Ct., 381 N.E.2d 1245 (Ind. 1978); see also
French v. Blackbum, 428 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (rejecting a claim of the
protection of the Fifth Amendment in involuntary civil commitment proceedings).
79. State ex rel. Kiritsis, 381 N.E.2d at 1247–48.
80. See Matter of Baker, 324 N.W.2d 91 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Matter of
Matthews, 613 P.2d 88 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (noting that due process does not require
the patient be afforded the right to remain silent).
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assert his Fifth Amendment privilege whenever his testimony might
implicate him in a criminal matter.81 Matthews cited Justice Douglas’
concurrence to the Supreme Court case McNeil v. Patuxent
Institution Director,82 in which Justice Douglas concluded that the
privilege did apply to any statements that might serve as a basis for
commitment because there is harm and self-incrimination whenever
there is a deprivation of liberty and there is such deprivation if the
person is held against his will. A commitment is improper where it is
based on statements made to a psychiatrist that lack evidence that
such statements were made voluntarily after the individual was given
notice that his statements might contribute to his commitment and
that he is not obligated to speak.83
The Matthews Court rationale for not extending the privilege was
its conclusion that the best way to ascertain an individual’s condition
at the civil commitment hearing is to question him and observe his
demeanor, making it extremely difficult to commit persons in need of
help if they refuse to talk.84 However, courts would not make such an
assertion in a criminal prosecution, making the claim that the
defendant’s own statements are necessary to incarcerate him.
Evidence and testimony forming the basis of civil commitment should
rely on observations of others and the acts of the mentally ill — not
from that person’s statements.
There are instances in which the judge presiding over the
commitment hearing directly questions the mentally ill person to
decide whether to confine the person to an inpatient psychiatric
hospital. In challenging the trial judge calling him to the stand, the
respondent facing commitment in Matter of Baker unsuccessfully
asserted that there was a violation of due process and the Fifth
Amendment.85
The protection of the right against self-incrimination by statute in
some states is in stark contrast to states that refuse to recognize the
right against self-incrimination in the civil commitment context by
judicial decision.86 Other state legislatures should draft legislation to
incorporate the right to remain silent and the privilege against self81. Oregon v. Matthews, 613 P.2d 88, 90 (Or. App. 1980). However, such is the
case in all civil contexts. The privilege applies wherever there is future prosecution or
a threat or risk of future prosecution, and the statement reveals inculpatory
information.
82. McNeil v. Patuxent Institution Director, 407 U.S. 254 (1972).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 91.
85. Matter of Baker, 324 N.W.2d 91 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
86. See Appendix A.

804

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIII

incrimination in civil commitment proceedings. The loss of liberty
caused by the impact of a civil commitment decision requires states to
act to extend the right against self-incrimination and the right to
remain silent to the civil commitment context.
In addition, the mentally ill person is often compelled to submit to
a psychiatric evaluation, and the information so obtained is used
against him in the civil commitment hearing. 87 In New Hampshire,
the state Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination does not protect against giving evidence
relating to civil commitment.88 The Court took a narrow view of the
Fifth Amendment privilege and reasoned that the privilege only
applies where the evidence elicited would result in a future criminal
prosecution.89 The authority permitting mental health professionals to
testify at civil commitment hearings also permits the mental health
professional to base such testimony in large part on statements and
conversation elicited from the person now subject to an involuntary
civil commitment.
III. THE AUTHORITY OF A MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONAL TO
TESTIFY AT A CIVIL COMMITMENT HEARING: CAN THE PATIENT
PREVENT THE INTRODUCTION OF STATEMENTS MADE DURING THE
COURSE OF THE PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION?
As part of a state’s civil commitment process, the person subjected
to involuntary confinement in a psychiatric hospital will be examined
by a psychiatrist, psychologist, or physician to determine the need for
forced confinement.90 Usually, the process starts in an emergency
room setting, where the police91 or the person’s family members bring
him for an emergency evaluation. At that time, an examination is
conducted to determine if the mentally ill person is in need of
hospitalization.92 This exam begins the process in which there are
conversations between the patient and physicians, which form the
basis for the evidence presented at an involuntary civil commitment
hearing.93 Once admitted to the inpatient hospital, the patient is

87. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. § 10-619.
88. In re Field, 412 A.2d 1032 (N.H. 1980).
89. See id.
90. See, e.g., 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302 (providing that a physician of the
facility shall examine the patient and determine the need for treatment); see also MO.
ANN. STAT. § 632.335.
91. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. § 10-632(e).
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examined by a hospital psychiatrist to determine the need for
hospitalization.94 The patient then awaits a civil commitment hearing
that takes place in two to ten days.95 During this time, the patient will
undergo daily examinations and interviews with the treating
psychiatrist who will present testimony at the civil commitment
hearing seeking continued hospitalization. The mentally ill person
will have daily contact with mental health professionals who will be
offering the patient treatment for his or her mental illness but who
will also be providing testimony at the upcoming civil commitment
hearing. On the one hand, the psychiatrist and patient will be
establishing a trusting and therapeutic relationship, but on the other
hand, lingering in the background is the psychiatrist’s need to develop
evidence to prove the patient is a danger to self or others and in need
of hospitalization.
Can the patient prevent the psychiatrist from sharing the
communication obtained during the psychiatrist-patient relationship?
What privilege might apply to exclude certain testimony that is the
subject of the civil commitment hearing?
The Supreme Court first recognized the psychotherapist-patient
privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 in Jaffee v. Redmond.96
In Jaffee the Court held that confidential communications between
psychotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or
treatment are protected from compelled disclosure under Federal
Rule of Evidence 501.97 The Court left the specific contours of the
privilege up to the lower courts.98 The general approach is that the
privilege is inapplicable to civil commitment proceedings.99
94. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. § 10-619.
95. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-83 (fourteen days); ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.715
(seventy-two hours); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-211 (three days).
96. 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996).
97. Id.; Fed. R. Evid. 501.
98. In re Miller, 585 N.E.2d 396, 404 (Ohio 1992) (the psychiatrist testifying at the
hearing was the patient’s treating physician).
99. See Walden Behavioral Care v. K.I., 2014 Mass. App. Div. 1 (2013) (holding
that no warning is required as precondition to admissibility of patient-psychotherapist
communications at civil commitment hearings, and testimonial privilege for patientpsychotherapist communications does not apply to civil commitment proceedings); In
re Sandra H., 846 A.2d 513 (N.H. 2004) (holding there was rational basis for treating
civil committees and criminal committees differently, thus a statute making waiver of
physician-patient privilege automatic for civil committees, and not for criminal
committees, did not violate mental health patient’s equal protection rights); Matter of
T.C.F., 400 N.W.2d 544, 549–550 (Iowa 1987) (holding state statutory privilege
inapplicable to involuntary hospitalization proceedings on basis that the statute’s
terms made it inapplicable to any civil action in which the condition of the person is
element of claim or defense); People v. District Court, County of Adams, State of
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Some jurisdictions render the privilege inapplicable by statute.100
In Illinois, a person subjected to an involuntary commitment
proceeding must first be notified that statements made to the
evaluating practitioner may be used in the commitment hearing;
failure to give this warning results in the inadmissibility of the
testimony.101 Other states hold that the privilege is indeed applicable
in the context of civil commitments, but it is limited to certain
circumstances and does not apply where the testimony is based on
information obtained in the course of the commitment evaluations.102
Ohio is illustrative of this approach.103
When a physician testified at a commitment hearing and the
subject of the testimony was based on his ten-year relationship with
the patient, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the testimonial
privilege was applicable.104 The Court specifically held that Ohio’s
statutory physician-patient privilege makes no exception for civil
commitment proceedings and that such privilege applies “in the
appropriate commitment situation[.]”105

Colo., 797 P.2d 1259 (1990) (holding privilege inapplicable where information is
obtained in course of evaluating individual who is involuntarily committed); Matter
of R., 641 P.2d 704 (Wash. 1982) (holding the physician-patient privilege did not
apply in involuntary commitment proceedings where issue was whether further
treatment was needed, and where patients had not been told that their psychiatrists
were communicating with them solely for treatment purposes); SHIRLEY J.
MCAULIFFE, 1 ARIZ. PRAC., LAW OF EVIDENCE § 501:7 (4th ed. 2014) (citing ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701–36-3717 (2014)). (In Arizona, “the privilege does not
apply to evaluation and treatment records sought in a proceeding for the civil
commitment of a person pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Act. A.R.S. §§ 363701 to 36-3717.”).
100. California’s evidence code contains a provision rending the privilege
inapplicable in the context of civil commitments. 29B CAL. EVID. CODE § 1004. In
involuntary civil commitment proceedings instituted in Texas, the physician-patient
privilege is waived if the state seeks court-ordered treatment or probable cause for
involuntary commitment to a mental health institution. TEX. R. EVID. 509(e)(6).
However, the privilege applies in certain circumstances. See Salas v. State, 592
S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (holding statute providing physician-patient
communications are confidential applies to mental health commitments).
101. Matter of Collins, 429 N.E.2d 531 (Ill. 1981) (holding in involuntary
commitment, an examining physician must first personally inform patient of his
rights, in absence of which he will not be permitted to testify as to patient’s
admissions at any subsequent court hearing).
102. See, e.g., People v. District Court, County of Adams, State of Colo., 797 P.2d
1259 (1990).
103. See In re Miller, 585 N.E.2d 396, 404 (Ohio 1992).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 404–05 (noting that a different result may arise if the testimony of the
physician was limited to facts learned in the course of evaluating the patient for the
present commitment only).
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In reaching its holding, the Ohio court noted that the privilege is
inapplicable to civil commitment proceedings in many states.106 The
court also noted that the best practice is to have an independent
physician examine the patient in conjunction with a civil commitment
proceeding.107 However, in a different case, where the patient did not
consult the testifying physician for treatment but instead was “forced
to undergo examination and treatment as part of the judicial
hospitalization procedures[,]” the privilege is not applicable.108
As a reasonable compromise of competing interests, from the
patient’s right of privacy and confidence in the psychotherapistpatient relationship to the state’s obligation to provide treatment for
the dangerously mentally ill, the psychiatrist should provide
documentation that the patient was advised that any statements made
to the psychiatrist during the course of the evaluation or treatment
may be used against the person at the civil commitment hearing.
Additionally, the patient should be provided with a written statement
advising him or her that statements made to the hospital psychiatrist
can be repeated at the civil commitment hearing. In the alternative,
the psychiatrist should be required to provide written documentation
in the medical record that such a disclosure was provided to the
patient at the start of their relationship. Without such a finding, the
treating psychiatrist should be required to limit testimony of the
patient’s behavior based exclusively on what was reasonably observed
by the psychiatrist and not what was told to him by the patient in
confidence.
IV. THE APPLICABILITY OF EVIDENCE RULES AND THE USE OF
HEARSAY AT THE COMMITMENT HEARING
It is often said that the rules of evidence at a civil commitment
hearing are loosely applied.109 The most controversial evidentiary
issue in administrative adjudications involves the treatment of
hearsay.110 Often testimony presented at the civil commitment
hearing relies on declarations of family members, employers,
106. Id. at 404 (“Responding to these and other considerations, a number of states
expressly render the privilege inapplicable in civil commitment proceedings. See, e.g.,
29B CAL. EVID. CODE § 1004 (1996). Other states reach the same result by providing
that the privilege does not apply when a person’s mental condition is at issue.”).
107. Id. at 405.
108. In re Winstead, 425 N.E.2d 943, 945 (Ohio 1980).
109. For a table of authority illustrating various states’ approaches to the
applicability of evidentiary rules to civil commitment hearings, see Appendix B.
110. See ARNOLD ROCHVARG, MARYLAND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (MICPEL 2d.
ed. 2007).
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neighbors, mental health professionals, police, and other interested
individuals who interacted with the mentally ill person prior to the
hospital confinement. The state often follows its state’s
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in addressing contested cases,
including evidentiary issues.111 The Maryland APA provides that
“evidence may not be excluded solely on the basis that it is
hearsay.”112 At the civil commitment hearing, the hospital relies
heavily on hearsay in presenting evidence on the patient’s recent
behavior and need for current hospitalization. The decision to commit
a patient to a psychiatric hospital must be supported by substantial
evidence and must comport with due process. In order to satisfy the
substantial evidence test, there must be sufficiently probative and
reliable evidence. The “hearsay evidence must demonstrate sufficient
reliability and probative value to satisfy the requirement of
procedural due process.”113 The significant nature of the matter in
dispute, the freedom of the mentally ill person, should raise concerns
regarding the reliance on hearsay as the sole basis for the decision to
retain the person in a psychiatric hospital.
There are twenty-nine states that have addressed the issue of the
applicability of evidentiary rules at the civil commitment hearing.114
Of those states, nineteen appear to require that the rules of evidence
apply during the commitment hearing,115 six apply the rules of
evidence on an explicitly informal basis,116 and four states have
express statutory provisions that provide that the hearing officer is
not bound by the rules of evidence.117 Two states, New Jersey118 and

111. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. STATE GOV’T § 10-213.
112. See, e.g., id.
113. Travers v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, 693 A.2d 378 (Mt. Ct. Spec. App. 1997).
114. See Appendix B for a table of state law on applicability of the rules of
evidence to involuntary commitment hearings.
115. ALA. CODE 1975 § 22-52-9; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17A-498; IDAHO CODE §
66-329; KY. REV. STAT. § 202A.076; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:55; ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. TIT. 34-B, § 3864; MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-73; MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.335;
MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-115; NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-955; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30: 427.33; In re R.D., 739 A.2d 548 (Pa. Super. 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-8; TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN §574.031; UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A –15– 631; 18
VERMONT STAT. ANN. § 7615; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.310; W. VA. CODE, §
27-5-4; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20.
116. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735; IDAHO CODE § 66-329; MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.335;
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-570.
117. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5256.4; IOWA CODE § 229.12 3; KAN. STAT. ANN. §
59-2959; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.07; In re Zollicoffer, 598 S.E.2d 696 (N.C. App.
2004).
118. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30: 4-27.33.
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Kentucky,119 are notable for their express statutory requirements that
the same rules of evidence that are applicable in criminal cases apply
at the civil commitment hearing.
As part of the psychiatrist’s testimony at the civil commitment
hearing, information such as the police interaction at the initial
incident that led to the present hospitalization, the examination at the
emergency room where the patient was initially transported for
evaluation, as well as conversations with family members becomes
central to the psychiatrist’s testimony.120 The patient who is subject to
involuntary hospitalization is denied the opportunity to cross-examine
the key individuals, whether the police, emergency room staff, or
family members, when the testifying psychiatrist offers statements
from said individuals as part of his testimony at the hearing. The
right to confront witnesses as provided in the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution121 is denied in the civil commitment
arena. In the case of In re Irwin, the Court found that the
confrontation clause is not applicable in civil commitment
proceedings.122 Due to the serious liberty interests impacted in the
civil commitment hearings, it is recommended that the rules of
evidence are more strictly followed at civil commitment hearings and
that the Confrontation Clause apply. The rampant hearsay offered at
civil commitment hearings should be drastically reduced, requiring an
overwhelming showing of reliability before such hearsay testimony is
considered.
In consideration of the significant deprivation of freedom as well as
the stigma associated with an involuntary civil commitment, it is
recommended that other states follow the New Jersey and Kentucky
approach to the treatment of hearsay and the rules of evidence
generally. The confinement against one’s will is more akin to the
criminal consequences of punishment than to pure treatment,
necessitating greater adherence to due process, specifically with the
applicability of the rules of evidence. Where other due process
protections are severally limited or even completely lacking, at the
very least the decision to deprive a person of his freedom should be
based on reliable evidence that possesses adequate guarantees of
trustworthiness and accuracy.

119.
120.
121.
122.

KY. REV. STAT. § 202A.076.

See In re Zollicoffer, 598 S.E.2d 696 (N.C. App. 2004).
U.S. CONST., AMEND. VI.
In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 366, 377 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
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V. THE BURDEN OF PROOF STANDARD EMPLOYED IN THE CIVIL
COMMITMENT HEARING
In Addington v. Texas, the Supreme Court announced the
minimum burden of proof in civil commitment hearings as the clear
and convincing standard.123 The Court recognized the adverse social
consequences to an individual from an involuntary commitment to a
mental hospital in setting a minimum standard above the
preponderance of the evidence standard.124 The Court further held
that the precise burden to be used must be equal to or greater than
the clear and convincing standard but is a matter of state law.125
Following the Addington decision, several states selected the criminal
standard of proof, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, for civil
commitments.126
Kentucky requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt for the
hospitalization of the mentally ill.127 In Hawaii, the criteria for
whether the person subject to involuntary hospitalization has a
mental illness likewise must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.128
A third state, Montana, requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt
with respect to any physical facts of evidence and clear and
convincing evidence as to all other matters.129 Additionally, like
Kentucky, Montana requires the existence of the person’s mental
disorder to be proved to a reasonable medical certainty.130
In addition to these state legislatures enacting the higher standard
of proof, at least one state has done the same by judicial measures.131
In Massachusetts, the court in Commonwealth v. Nassar mandated
that a mentally ill person shall not be involuntarily committed unless
the person’s release would create a substantial risk of harm to other
persons and that such substantial risk must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.132
The loss of liberty and serious stigma attached to the involuntary
civil commitment of a person with mental illness should necessitate

123. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
124. See id.
125. Id. at 443.
126. KY. REV. STAT. § 202A.076(2); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126; HAW. REV.
STAT. § 334-60.3; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5256.6.
127. KY. REV. STAT. § 202A.076(2).
128. HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-60.3.
129. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126.
130. Id.
131. Com. v. Nassar 406 N.E.2d 1286 (1980).
132. Id.
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the requirement that all criteria for retention in a psychiatric hospital
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State legislatures are
encouraged to adopt this higher standard as proof, as required in the
criminal context.133
VI. THE RIGHT TO AN INDEPENDENT PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION
In a typical civil commitment hearing, testimony regarding the
mentally ill person’s need for inpatient psychiatric hospitalization is
usually provided by the hospital psychiatrist.134 The testifying
psychiatrist is in a unique position, having a current understanding of
the person’s psychiatric condition and behavior based on being the
expert charged with treating the patient.
What is more, courts are extremely deferential to the expertise of
the treating psychiatrist, especially on the prediction that the person
poses a danger to oneself or others. Occasionally a family member
may testify at the civil commitment hearing, describing recent
behavior on the part of the mentally ill person that justified the
request for hospitalization, although the family member frequently
testifies on behalf of the hospital.
The patient’s case in chief is usually the testimony of the patient
himself. Understanding that the judge may often discredit the
testimony of the patient as lacking insight into his illness or view the
patient as in denial over his illness, it is likely that judges often receive
a distorted picture of the patient’s condition. In order to level the
playing field and offer an objective perspective on the important
issues of whether there is a less restrictive alternative to inpatient
hospitalization and whether there is a risk of danger to self or others
if the person is released, several states have provided for the right to
an independent psychiatric evaluation.135

133. For a table of current state laws regarding the burden of proof applicable to
an involuntary civil commitment hearing, see Appendix C.
134. See e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. § 10-619.
135. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-538; N.D. CENT. CODE. ANN. § 25-03.1-02; ALASKA
STAT. § 47.30.745; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1463; MASS. GEN. LAW. ANN. 123 §
5; COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-65-127; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-11; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 5007; FLA. STAT. ANN. §394.467; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-8; 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
5/3-804; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:54; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 34-B, § 3864; MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 253B.07; MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-118; NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-908;
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15; ORE. REV. STAT. § 426.110; S.C. CODE ANN. § 4417-530; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-12-3.14; 18 Vermont Stat. Ann. §§ 7113, 7114;
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.360; W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20.
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In Florida and Texas the court may order an independent
evaluation if the evaluation will assist the fact finder.136 Illinois and
Michigan also provide for the right to an independent clinical
evaluation at public expense for indigent individuals.137 Several states
permit the selection of the independent evaluator to be a person of
the mentally ill person’s own choice.138
The opportunity to receive an independent evaluation to counter
the testimony of the hospital’s treating psychiatrist is imperative. The
independent evaluator’s ability to attend and testify at the civil
commitment hearing is a significant benefit to the patient, resulting in
the presentation of alternatives to inpatient hospitalization, in
addition to a different perspective of the mentally ill person’s
dangerousness.139 The civil commitment hearing, thus, begins to
conform to the standards of due process when the judge hears opinion
testimony from two psychiatrists who offer their perspective on the
need, or not, for inpatient psychiatric hospitalization.
It is strongly recommended that all states provide the right to an
independent psychiatric evaluation. These evaluations should be free
of charge for indigent persons, and the evaluator should be able to
testify at the civil commitment hearing. It is also encouraged that the
independent psychiatrist be permitted to observe the mentally ill
person in the hospital setting for a reasonable period of time to be in
the best position to respond to the opinion of the hospital psychiatrist,
whose testimony at the hearing is generally to advocate for in-patient
hospitalization.
VII. ALTERNATIVES TO THE ADVERSARIAL CIVIL COMMITMENT
HEARING
The current approach to addressing the involuntary civil
commitment of a mentally ill person is through an adversarial hearing
before a judge. The mentally ill person is represented by counsel, and
the state has its representative at the hearing.140 The trier of fact will
hear testimony and evidence and make a determination on whether
or not to confine the mentally ill person in a psychiatric hospital.

136. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(6)(a)(2); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
574.010.
137. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/3-804; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1463.
138. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-118.
139. For a complete state by state listing of the right to independent evaluations,
see Appendix D.
140. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(3).
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Alternatives to the adversarial model are hard to find. Mediation,
however, is rarely utilized. Is it the unequal bargaining position
between the hospital and the patient that necessitates an adversarial
proceeding over mediation? Or is there a belief that there is not a
workable compromise available? Either you are confined in a
hospital setting for an indefinite period of time or you are not.
Should we take a closer look at alternatives to the current civil
commitment hearing that may result in better outcomes for people
with mental illness?
Mediation involves a neutral third party assisting conflicted parties,
the patient and the hospital, by expanding communication between
said parties. Often, there is a conflict over the length of stay in the
hospital, whereby a patient may feel more comfortable with a fixed
end day while the hospital may prefer an open-ended discharge day.
Mediation may be able to facilitate discussion on the length of the
hospital stay, which might also include day passes to leave the
hospital temporarily.141
Another source of conflict may involve the specific psychotropic
medication being prescribed. The mediation may offer a better
setting to reach consensus on the specific medication, explaining the
purpose, benefits, and side effects, as well as possible alternatives.
Rather than leaving the specific medication regiment in the hands of
the treating psychiatrist, the mediator may be able to propose certain
medication approaches that lead a patient to accept his or her
treatment options voluntarily, rather than being coerced into
accepting them.142
Furthermore, mediation may be capable of offering alternatives to
the involuntary hospitalization option, such as discharge to a less
restrictive setting or a postponement or delay to more fully explore
alternatives. The hospital psychiatrist may be more inclined to accept
discharge to a less restrictive setting if the mediation can encourage
dialogue surrounding an out-patient plan, including housing and
treatment. “Mediation may provide an opportunity for people with

141. See Robert Rubinson, Client Counseling, Mediation and Alternative
Narratives of Dispute Resolution, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 833, 837 (2004) (discussing

benefits of mediation).
142. For example, the patient may prefer a specific medication among medications
of the same class due to side-effects. At mediation, the exact medications, or choices
of medications, may be stipulated.
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mental illness to fashion the appropriate treatment for their needs
without undergoing involuntary confinement.”143
It is encouraged that, prior to the involuntary civil commitment
hearing being conducted, an offer should be made to explore
mediation as an alternative to addressing the treatment needs of a
mentally ill person.
VIII. OTHER THAN THE MENTALLY ILL PERSON, WHO SHOULD BE
PERMITTED TO CONSENT TO IN-PATIENT TREATMENT?:
GUARDIAN, POWER OF ATTORNEY OR PARENT
Should a legal guardian be permitted to voluntarily admit a
mentally ill person to a psychiatric hospital?144 What about a person
with a power of attorney voluntarily admitting a person under her
care? Should a person be permitted to draft an advance directive
relating to mental health services for himself?
Most states provide for the admission of an individual to a
psychiatric hospital through the voluntary admission process.145
Maryland, for example, requires the patient to meet five criteria: (1)
the individual has a mental disorder; (2) the mental disorder is
susceptible to care or treatment; (3) the individual understands the
nature of the request for admission; (4) the individual is able to give
continuous consent to retention in the facility; and (5) the individual
is able to ask for release.146
In the context of a third party seeking voluntary admission of a
mentally ill person, the third party is not bound by these statutory
considerations, which serve as important safeguards for the mentally
ill person. When a substitute decision maker, such as a guardian or
person with a power of attorney or durable power of attorney through
a living will, makes the decision to seek voluntary admission of the
mentally ill person on whose behalf they act, the voluntary admission
process is compromised. Moreover, while there may be benefits of
voluntary admission over involuntary admission, such as less stigma

143. Henry Chen, Current Development 2005-2006: The Mediation Approach:
Representing Clients with Mental Illness in Civil Commitment 19 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 599, 612 (2006).
144. For a table of authority regarding a guardian’s ability to make mental health
care decisions for his or her ward, see Appendix E.
145. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.04.
146. MD. COD ANN., HEALTH GEN. § 10-609(c).
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and more cooperation between the patient and the hospital, there is a
clear lack of judicial or attorney oversight.147
The requirement that the individual involved in the voluntary
admission must understand the nature of the request for admission or
be able to give continuous assent to retention by the facility is often
ignored when a hospital accepts the request by a third-party decision
maker.
There are some states that recognize guardians who are authorized
to make decisions for the health care of an individual when the
individual is incapable of making an informed decision.148 However,
in Maryland, the Health Care Decision Act expressly forbids a
surrogate from authorizing treatment for a mental disorder.149
The Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act,
followed by thirty states,150 prohibits guardians from committing an
individual to a mental health facility except in accordance with the
state’s procedure for involuntary civil commitment.151 Persons with a
power of attorney, who are authorized to make hospital and personal
decisions, might also be authorized by the power of attorney to make
the choice to voluntarily admit the individual under their care. 152
When the person with the power of attorney seeks out a voluntary
admission of the mentally ill individual to a psychiatric hospital, but
such admission is opposed by the mentally ill individual, the state

147. See Donald Stone, The Benefits of Voluntary Inpatient Psychiatric
Hospitalization: Myth or Reality?, 9 BOS. U. PUB. INT. L.J. 25 (1999).
148. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. §-605(a)(2) surrogates priority are guardians
if appointed spouse or domestic partner, adult child, parent, sibling of the patient or
friend or other relative.
149. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. §-605(d).
150. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.150; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-5312.01; ARK. CODE ANN. §
28-65-303; CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-316; CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 45A- 656; DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 12, § 3922; D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2047.01;
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3215; HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:5-316; 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
5/11A-17; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3075; LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. ART. 4566; MD.
CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 708; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 190B, § 5-309; MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 524.5-315; MO. ANN. STAT. § 475.120; MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-322;
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:12-56; N.Y. MENTAL
HYGIENE LAW § 81.22; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-28-12 (5-312); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. TIT. 30, § 3-119; OR. REV. STAT. § 125.320; 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521; TEX.
EST. CODE § 1151.053; VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 14, § 3074; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
11.92.043; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.25; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3-2-202. See also Hawaii,
Minnesota, and New Jersey.
151. Karna Sandler, A Guardian’s Health Care Decision-Making Authority:
Statutory Restrictions, 35 BIFOCAL 106, 107 (2014).
152. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 18-A, § 5-312 (providing that guardian “may
place the ward in any hospital or other institution for care in the same manner as
otherwise provided by law.”).
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should utilize its involuntary civil commitment process rather than the
voluntary admission process. States should be prohibited from
allowing a person with power of attorney from seeking voluntary
admission of a mentally ill person under his or her care when opposed
by the mentally ill person, as this admission is clearly not voluntary.
Another mechanism for circumventing the involuntary admission
process is through the use of advance directives. In Maryland, the
Health Care Decision Act permits an individual to create an advance
directive153 for mental health services.154 The advance directive takes
effect upon a finding by two physicians that the person is incapable of
making an informed decision about treatment.155
When the
individual has expressed disagreement with the action of seeking
voluntary admission to a psychiatric hospital, the hospital should
proceed through the state’s involuntary admission process.156
When the mentally ill individual has expressed no opinion as to the
voluntary admission to a psychiatric hospital requested by a person
designated with authority under the directive, hospitals are often in a
dilemma as far as the validity of their authority to proceed with a
voluntary hospital admission. In Cohen v. Bolduc, the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts declared that absent an express limitation, an
agent is authorized to endorse a voluntary admission on behalf of an
individual in situations where he does not object to treatment.157 The
court authorized the power to voluntarily admit the mentally ill
person to a mental health facility.158 The Court reasoned that
permitting a guardian to consent to admission ensured respect for the
patient’s autonomy insofar as it honors the patient’s previous
decision. However, the Court failed to recognize the potential that a
patient could change his or her mind and no longer wishes to
Moreover, authorizing
authorize inpatient hospitalization.159

153. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining
“advance directive” as “[a] document that takes effect upon one’s incompetency and
designates a surrogate decision-maker for healthcare matters”).
154. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. § 5-602.1 (2015). Such directives may provide
for various specifications, including the designation of an agent to make mental
health services decisions, the identification of a mental health facility to provide
services, preferred medications, and notification to third parties. Id.
155. Id.
156. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. § 5-611(e)(2); see also 91 Md. Op. Att’y Gen.
3 (2006) (advocating to prohibit an application for voluntary admission if the patient
“has expressed disagreement with the action”).
157. Cohen v. Bolduc, 760 N.E.2d 714 (Mass. 2002). For a comprehensive
education of state guardianship laws, see Appendix E.
158. Id. at 719.
159. Id. at 722.
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substitute decision makers to consent to such admissions bypasses due
process to ensure that the patient is truly incompetent to make the
decision for his or her self. Several states have prohibited the use of
advance directives for voluntary admission.160
With the variation of state approaches regarding the authority of
an advance directive with respect to voluntary psychiatric hospital
admission, there is a need for a more thoughtful, unified approach. In
situations where the mentally ill person has expressed opposition to a
voluntary admission, the state should be required to proceed through
the involuntary admission process. When the person subject to the
voluntary admission has expressed no opinion, the designated agent
should be permitted to proceed with the voluntary hospitalization
subject to specific mandatory requirements. First, an attorney should
be appointed to represent the interests of the mentally ill person. The
hospital should evaluate its ability to provide inpatient treatment.
Second, a judge should review the case to determine if the mentally ill
person is in favor of or opposed to the voluntary admission,
determine if the person would benefit from hospitalization, and limit
the inpatient admission to thirty days. If an extension beyond thirty
days is sought, a second judicial review should be required, with the
patient again represented by counsel.
With the increase in advance directives that include mental health
services decisions, states should require a judicial review and scrutiny
of the voluntary admission processes. In those states that permit
advance directives to include inpatient mental health hospitalization,
the requirement of judicial review will ensure the interests of the
mentally ill person are protected but will still permit voluntary
hospitalization when necessary and appropriate.
IX. RECOMMENDATIONS TO REPAIR THE BROKEN INVOLUNTARY
CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCESS
Recognizing the liberty interests at stake in civil commitment
decisions, it is crucial that our state commitment laws reflect the
paramount imperative that the due process rights of mentally ill
persons are protected. For individuals with mental illness who pose a
danger to themselves or others and are in need of treatment, the

160. Alabama (ALA. CODE 1975 § 26-1-2); California (CAL. PROBATE CODE §
4682); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-7);
Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.03); Nevada (N.R.S. 162A.700); New
Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. § 137-J:5); Texas (V.T.C.A., CIVIL PRACTICE &
REMEDIES CODE § 137.001); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.01) and Wyoming
(WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-302).
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challenge is to furnish the necessary care while protecting their
constitutional right to be treated in a humane setting with the due
process protections we afford those who are confined against their
will.
The following are recommendations to guide state legislatures in
developing and implementing an enlightened, comprehensive, and
fair involuntary civil commitment statute for the mentally ill citizens
facing involuntary confinement.
1. Provide that all persons facing civil commitment are entitled to
the right to remain silent.
2. Extend the applicability of the Miranda warning rights to
police involved in the civil commitment patient
3. Provide that all persons facing civil commitment are entitled to
the right against self-incrimination insofar as they may refuse to
testify at the hearing.
4. Provide that mentally ill persons are entitled to the privilege of
confidentiality between psychiatrist and patient, extending such
privilege to civil commitment hearings.
5. Require the burden of proof in involuntary civil commitment
hearings to be the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
6. Require the formal rules of evidence to apply to the civil
commitment hearings, including the rule against hearsay.
7. Provide all persons facing involuntary civil commitment
hearings a right to an independent psychiatric evaluation and at state
expense if indigent.
8. Offer the option of mediation as an alternative dispute
resolution to the contested involuntary commitment hearing.
9. Require a judge to review all voluntary admissions to an
inpatient psychiatric hospital, including those sought by the patient,
guardian, or health care agent.
The involuntary civil commitment process is under great scrutiny
today, with some seeking greater protection while others are seeking
a relaxation of rights afforded in the adversarial system. With
significant media coverage of persons with mental illness involved in
recent tragedies, from the Virginia Tech massacre161 to the Aurora,
Colorado, movie theater shootings,162 there is a call for loosening the
procedures for committing a dangerously mentally ill person to a

161. See Virginia Tech Shooting Fast Facts, CNN (Apr. 13, 2015, 12:03 PM),
http://www.cnn.com /2013/10/31/us/virginia-tech-shootings-fast-facts/.
162. See Aurora Shooting, HUFFINGTON POST http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
news/aurora-shooting/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
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psychiatric hospital. Clearly, there is a need for greater outpatient
mental health treatment options, as well as suitable housing
arrangements for persons with mental illness. However, to reduce the
protections for the mentally ill person facing involuntary civil
commitment, or to make the process more convenient for the state, is
both short-sighted and counterproductive. Moreover, it is a violation
of a person’s liberty. We, as a society, should provide greater
protections to the mentally ill, ensuring that involuntary inpatient
hospitalization is truly a last resort when all less restrictive forms of
intervention are either inappropriate or unavailable.
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APPENDIX A: RIGHTS TO REMAIN SILENT, AGAINST
COMPELLED TESTIMONY, OR AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Alabama
Alaska
Arkansas
California

Colorado

Delaware

Florida
Hawaii

Illinois

ALA. CODE § 22-52-9 (2016): Right not to be compelled to
testify against self.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735(b)(8) (2016): Right to remain
silent.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-211 (2016): Right to remain
silent.
Conservatorship of Bones, 234 Cal. Rptr. 724 (Ct. App.
1987): At post-certification treatment hearing (for
extended commitment) county attorney moved to call
appellant-patient as a witness and the trial court granted
the motion. The trial court issued orders remanding
Appellant to hospital. Appellant appealed, arguing inter
alia it was an error to compel him to testify. In analogizing
the present case to a line of precedent cases where a
criminal defendant’s privilege not to testify was not
extended to parties in non-criminal proceedings, the
California Court of Appeals held that the trial court did
not err in ordering Appellant to testify at his postcertification treatment hearing.
People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980): On appeal of
a dismissal of hearing to confirm certification of
respondent for short-term treatment, the Colorado
Supreme Court distinguished civil commitment process
from criminal proceedings, holding “due process does not
require that the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination be extended to Colorado’s civil commitment
proceedings to bar the respondent from being called upon
to testify or to justify her absence from court during the
certification proceedings.” Id. at 1138–39.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit.16, § 5006 (2016): Privilege against
self-incrimination is applicable to all proceedings under
this chapter.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467 (West 2016): Patient may
refuse to testify at the hearing.
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 334-60.5 (West 2016): Nothing in
this section shall limit persons’ privilege against selfincrimination.
In re Nolan, 384 N.E.2d 134 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978): Nolan
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Indiana

Massachusetts

Michigan

appealed adjudication that he was in need of mental
treatment, arguing that it was constitutionally
impermissible for the state to call him as an adverse
witness. The Appellate Court of Illinois held that
“involuntary commitment proceedings do not encompass
the right against self-incrimination . . . thus one who is
subject to such matters may be called as an adverse
witness” and, furthermore, that so calling him as a witness
does not violate guarantees to effective assistance of
counsel. Id. at 135–36. The holding was based on the
rationale that accepting Nolan’s arguments “would
obscure the differentiation between a criminal trial and an
involuntary civil commitment.” Id. at 136.
State ex rel. Kiritsis v. Marion Probate Court, 381 N.E.2d
1245 (Ind. 1978): Patient petitioned to Supreme Court of
Indiana for a writ of mandate and prohibition asking for
the Court to order the Probate Court to recognize patient’s
right to remain silent. The Indiana Supreme Court held
that the privilege against self-incrimination has no
applicability in civil commitment proceedings on that
rationale that “the fact that a proceeding may result in the
deprivation of liberty does not automatically invoke the
protection of the Fifth Amendment” and “the legitimate
objectives of the statute and the interests of the State
would be wholly frustrated were individuals permitted to
claim the privilege in civil commitment proceedings.” Id. at
1247–48.
Commonwealth. v. Barboza, 438 N.E.2d 1064 (Mass 1982):
Miranda warnings were not required; Fifth Amendment
was not violated by use of respondent’s statement to his
psychiatrist.
In re Baker, 324 N.W.2d 91 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982): Over
counsel’s objections, appellant was called to the stand and
questioned by the judge pertaining to issues relating to
commitment of appellant. Appellant was subsequently
committed. The Court of Appeals held that trial court did
not violate appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights forcing him
to testify against himself. The Court based its holding on
the rationale that “the receipt of testimony from the
respondent in a commitment hearing can be analogized to
the admissibility of physical evidence, as opposed to
testimonial evidence, at a criminal trial” and “[n]o witness
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has the privilege to refuse to reveal to a trier of fact
pertinent physical or mental characteristics where they are
relevant to issues under consideration.” Id. at 94.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-73 (2016): Privilege against selfincrimination.
MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.335 (West 2016): Right to remain
silent.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-115 (West 2016): Any person
who is involuntarily detained or against whom petition is
filed has the right to remain silent.
In re Field, 412 A.2d 1032 (N.H. 1980): Patient argued that
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
would be violated if he was compelled to submit to a
psychiatric evaluation and the information so obtained was
used against him. The New Hampshire Supreme Court
held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination does not protect against giving evidence
relating to civil commitments. As long as those
proceedings do not seek to elicit evidence that may result
in any criminal prosecution, there is no privilege.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.33a (West 2016): The rules of
evidence applicable in criminal cases shall apply, and all
constitutional rights available to a defendant at a criminal
trial, other than the right to a trial by jury and the right not
to be tried while incompetent, shall apply.
Ughetto v. Acrish, 494 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1985), affirmed as
modified 518 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1987), appeal dismissed 518
N.E.2d 8 (1987), reconsideration denied 521 N.E.2d 438
(1988): Patient’s privilege against self-incrimination did not
apply to prevent hospital from using patient’s statements
made in course of prehearing psychiatric interview and
medical conclusions drawn therefrom to support
application for involuntary civil commitment.
French v. Blackbum, 428 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C. 1977):
Plaintiff challenged state involuntary commitment
procedures on the basis that they violate the Fifth
Amendment because, inter alia, they fail require that the
respondent be advised of his right against selfincrimination. A three-judge federal district court panel
held that the privilege against self-incrimination does not
apply to involuntary commitment proceedings on the basis
that “to apply the privilege to the type of proceedings here
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Ohio

Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

South Dakota

Tennessee

Vermont

challenged would be to destroy the valid purposes which
they serve as it would make them unworkable and
ineffective.”
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (West 2016): The
respondent has the right, but shall not be compelled, to
testify, and shall be so advised by the court.
In re D.J.L., 964 P.2d 983 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998): Patient
appealed order of involuntary civil commitment arguing,
inter alia, the trial court improperly overruled his
objections to being called as a witness. Oklahoma Court of
Civil Appeals affirmed the order, holding “that there is no
constitutional right against self-incrimination in an
involuntary commitment proceeding and that Oklahoma
law allows the State to call the person alleged to be
requiring treatment in support of its case.” Id. at 984.
In re Matthews, 613 P.2d 88 (Or. Ct. App. 1980): Patient
appealed Circuit Court order of commitment. Court of
Appeals held that due process did not require that he be
afforded right to remain silent if his testimony might be
used as a basis for commitment.
50 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7304(e) (West
2016): A hearing on a petition for court-ordered
involuntary treatment shall be conducted such that a
patient shall not be called as a witness without his consent.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-12-3.19 (2016): The person
may appear personally at any hearing and testify on his
own behalf, but the person may not be compelled to do so.
In re Helvenston, 658 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983):
Patient appealed the commitment order, asserting
violations of her federal constitutional rights. The
Tennessee Court of Appeals held that “proceedings under
the judicial hospitalization statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 33–
604, are civil in nature and are not criminal for Fifth
Amendment purposes.”
State v. McCarty, 892 A.2d 250 (Vt. 2006): Defendant was
charged with truancy for failing to send her child to school
and was subsequently arrested after an FTA with added
charges of resisting arrest. The trial court ordered a
psychiatric evaluation over defendant’s objections to
determine her competency to stand trial. Following a series
of more FTAs, charges/arrests, and court-ordered
evaluations, the defendant was deemed incompetent,
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insane, and was eventually ordered to involuntary
treatment based on testimony of an examining physician.
The defendant appealed the order, claiming that her
statements to the examining physician could not be used
against her in support of an involuntary commitment
order. The Supreme Court of Vermont held that once the
defendant was deemed incompetent, she was no longer at
risk for punishment and therefore her privilege against
self-incrimination was not implicated. Id. at 254. However,
the court noted that if such statements later surfaced in a
proceeding that could expose the speaker to potential
punishment, speaker could invoke her privilege to exclude
statements. Id.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.360(8) (West 2016): At
the probable cause hearing the detained person shall have
the right to remain silent.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-4(h)(4) (West 2016): The
individual may not be compelled to be a witness against
himself or herself.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20 (West 2016): Right to remain
silent.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-109 (2016): At the time of
emergency detention the person shall be informed orally
and in writing of his right to contact his family and an
attorney, of his right to appointed counsel if he is indigent,
of his right to remain silent and that his statements may be
used as a basis for involuntary hospitalization.
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APPENDIX B: APPLICABILITY OF EVIDENCE RULES AND USE OF
HEARSAY AT COMMITMENT HEARING
Alabama

Alaska

California

Connecticut

Idaho

Iowa

ALA. CODE § 22-52-9(5) (2016): The rules of evidence
applicable in other judicial proceedings in this state shall be
followed in involuntary commitment proceedings.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735(b)(4) (2016): At the
hearing . . . the respondent has the right to have the rules of
evidence and civil procedure applied so as to provide for
the informal but efficient presentation of evidence.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5256.4 (West 2016): (b)The
hearing shall be conducted in an impartial and informal
manner in order to encourage free and open discussion by
participants. The person conducting the hearing shall not
be bound by rules of procedure or evidence applicable in
judicial proceedings . . . (d) All evidence which is relevant
to establishing that the person certified is or is not as a
result of mental disorder or impairment by chronic
alcoholism, a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or
gravely disabled, shall be admitted at the hearing and
considered by the hearing officer. (e) Although resistance
to involuntary commitment may be a product of a mental
disorder, this resistance shall not, in itself, imply the
presence of a mental disorder or constitute evidence that a
person meets the criteria of being dangerous to self or
others, or gravely disabled.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-498(h) (West 2016): The
rules of evidence applicable to civil matters in the Superior
Court shall apply to hearings under this section.
IDAHO CODE § 66-329(10) (2016): The hearing shall be
conducted in as informal a manner as may be consistent
with orderly procedure. The court shall receive all relevant
and material evidence consistent with the rules of evidence.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.12 3.a. (West 2016): The
respondent’s welfare shall be paramount and the hearing
shall be conducted in as informal a manner as may be
consistent with orderly procedure, but consistent therewith
the issue shall be tried as a civil matter. Such discovery as is
permitted under the Iowa rules of civil procedure shall be
available to the respondent. The court shall receive all
relevant and material evidence which may be offered and
need not be bound by the rules of evidence.
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KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2959(c) (West 2016): The court shall
receive all relevant and material evidence which may be
offered. The rules governing evidentiary and procedural
matters shall be applied to hearings under this section in a
manner so as to facilitate informal, efficient presentation of
all relevant, probative evidence and resolution of issues
with due regard to the interests of all parties.
KY. REV. STAT. § 202A.076(2) (West 2016): The manner of
proceeding and rules of evidence shall be the same as those
in any criminal proceeding including the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
LA. STAT. ANN. § 28:55(D) (2016): . . . court shall conduct
the hearing in as formal a manner as is possible under the
circumstances and shall admit evidence according to the
usual rules of evidence.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 3864(c) (2016): The court
shall receive all relevant and material evidence that may be
offered in accordance with accepted rules of evidence and
accepted judicial dispositions.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1459(2) (West 2016): The
court shall receive all relevant, competent, and material
evidence which may be offered. The rules of evidence in
civil actions are applicable, except to the extent that specific
exceptions have been provided for in this chapter or
elsewhere by statute or court rule.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.07 (West 2016): Subd. 7.
Preliminary hearing. . . . (b) court may admit reliable
hearsay evidence, including written reports, for the purpose
of the preliminary hearing.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-73(3) (2016): The rules of
evidence applicable in other judicial proceedings in this
state shall be followed.
MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.335(2) (West 2016): The hearing
shall be conducted in as informal a manner as may be
consistent with orderly procedure and in a physical setting
not likely to have a harmful effect on the respondent. Due
consideration shall be given by the court to holding a
hearing at the mental health facility. The respondent shall
have the following rights in addition to those specified
elsewhere: . . . (7) To be proceeded against according to the
rules of evidence applicable to civil judicial proceedings;
MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.425 (West 2016). Physician-patient,
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Montana

Nebraska

New Jersey

North
Carolina

Ohio

Oregon

psychologist-patient privileges waived in detention
proceedings. The physician-patient privilege recognized by
section 491.060 and the psychologist-patient privilege
recognized by section 337.055 shall be deemed waived in
detention proceedings under this chapter. The fact that such
privileges have been waived pursuant to this section does
not by itself waive the privileges in any other proceeding,
civil or criminal. The waiver of the privileges shall extend
only to that evidence which is directly material and relevant
to detention proceedings.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-115 (West 2016): . . . any person
who is involuntarily detained or against whom a petition is
filed pursuant to this part has the following
rights: . . . (7) . . . the right in any hearing to be proceeded
against according to the rules of evidence applicable to civil
matters generally.
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-955 (West 2016): The rules of
evidence applicable in civil proceedings shall apply at all
hearings held under the Nebraska Mental Health
Commitment Act. In no event shall evidence be considered
which is inadmissible in criminal proceedings.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30: 4-27.33a (West 2016): The rules of
evidence applicable in criminal cases shall apply, and all
constitutional rights available to a defendant at a criminal
trial, other than the right to a trial by jury and the right not
to be tried while incompetent, shall apply.
In re Zollicoffer, 598 S.E.2d 696 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004):
Hearing before magistrate upon involuntary commitment
petition of patient was “miscellaneous proceeding” under
rule exempting certain proceedings from rules of evidence,
and thus, rules of evidence did not apply
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15(A)(9) (West 2016): The
court shall receive only reliable, competent, and material
evidence.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 426.095 (West 2016): The provisions
of §§ 40.230 [psychotherapist-patient privilege], 40.235
[physician-patient
privilege],
40.240
[nurse-patient
privilege] and 40.250 [regulated social worker-client
privilege] shall not apply to and the court may consider as
evidence any of the following . . . (B) Upon objection by
any party to the action, the court shall exclude any part of
the investigation report that may be excluded under the
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Oregon Evidence Code on grounds other than those set
forth in ORS 40.230, 40.235, 40.240 or 40.250. . . . (C)
Neither the investigation report nor any part thereof shall
be introduced into evidence under this paragraph unless the
investigator is present during the proceeding to be crossexamined or unless the presence of the investigator is
waived by the person alleged to have a mental illness or
counsel for the person.
Hearsay inadmissible for extended commitment hearing, In
re Hutchinson, 421 A.2d 261 (Pa. 1980), but admissible at
commitment hearings for less than 20 days. In re R.D., 739
A.2d 548 (Pa. 1999) (“The legislature, for whatever reason,
has determined that commitments for less than twenty days
do not require the same formalities as are necessary in
commitments for longer periods of time. Further,
appellant’s right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
necessarily implies that hearsay evidence is inadmissible. 50
P.S. s 7304(e)(3).”).
40.1 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-8(i)(1)(2016): All evidence shall be
presented according to the usual rules of evidence that
apply in civil, non-jury cases.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-570 (2016): Hearing shall be
conducted in as informal a manner as may be consistent
with orderly procedure and in a physical setting not likely to
have a harmful effect on the mental health of the person.
The court shall in receiving evidence follow the rules of
evidence applicable to the probate courts of this State.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.031(e) (West
2016): The Texas Rules of Evidence apply to the hearing
unless the rules are inconsistent with this subtitle.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A –15– 631(9)(e) (West 2016): The
court shall consider all relevant historical and material
information that is offered, subject to the rules of evidence,
including reliable hearsay under Rule 1102, Utah Rules of
Evidence.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 7615(c) (2016): The hearing shall be
conducted according to the Vermont Rules of Evidence,
and to an extent not inconsistent with this part, the
Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure shall be applicable.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.310 (West 2016): The
person shall be present at such proceeding, which shall in all
respects accord with the constitutional guarantees of due
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West Virginia

Wisconsin

process of law and the rules of evidence pursuant to RCW
71.05.360 (8) and (9).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.360(9) (West 2016):
Privileges between patients and physicians, psychologists, or
psychiatric advanced registered nurse practitioners are
deemed waived in proceedings under this chapter relating
to the administration of antipsychotic medications. As to
other proceedings under this chapter, the privileges shall be
waived when a court of competent jurisdiction in its
discretion determines that such waiver is necessary to
protect either the detained person or the public.
W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(j) (West 2016): Conduct of hearing;
receipt of evidence; no evidentiary privilege; record of
hearing . . . (2): The circuit court or mental hygiene
commissioner shall receive all relevant and material
evidence which may be offered. (3) The circuit court or
mental hygiene commissioner is bound by the rules of
evidence promulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals
except that statements made to physicians or psychologists
by the individual may be admitted into evidence by the
physician’s or psychologist’s testimony, notwithstanding
failure to inform the individual that this statement may be
used against him or her. A psychologist or physician
testifying shall bring all records pertaining to the individual
to the hearing. The medical evidence obtained pursuant to
an examination under this section, or section two or three of
this article, is not privileged information for purposes of a
hearing pursuant to this section.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(10)(c) (West 2016): Except as
otherwise provided in this chapter, the rules of evidence in
civil actions and s. 801.01(2) apply to any judicial
proceeding or hearing under this chapter
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APPENDIX C: BURDEN OF PROOF
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii

Idaho
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky

ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.4(a) (2016): clear and convincing
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735(c) (2016): clear and convincing
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540(a) (2016): clear and
convincing
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-214(b)(2) (2016): clear and
convincing
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5256.6 (West 2016): probable
cause; see also Dep’t of Corr. v. Office of Admin. Hearings,
61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 903 (Ct. App. 1997) (finding that although
proceedings to establish involuntary conservatorship for
person who is gravely disabled under Lanterman-PetrisShort Act (LPS) are essentially civil in nature, grave
disability must be proved beyond reasonable doubt to
unanimous jury because of risk to freedom and stigma
attached to involuntary conservatorship)
COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-65-111(1) (2016): clear and
convincing
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-498(c) (West 2016): clear and
convincing
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5011(a) (2016): clear and
convincing
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(1) (West 2016): clear and
convincing
Pitts v. State, 261 S.E.2d 435 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (finding
due process requires clear and convincing standard)
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 334-60.3(West 2016): clear &
convincing for dangerousness & in need of care & no less
restrictive alternatives but mental illness must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt
IDAHO CODE § 66-329(11) (2016): clear and convincing
In re Turner, 439 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982): clear and
convincing
IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.12(3)(c) (West 2016): clear and
convincing
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2969(f) (West 2016): clear and
convincing
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.076(2) (West 2016): manner
of proceeding and rules of evidence shall be the same as
those in any criminal proceeding including burden of proof
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Louisiana
Maine
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana

Nebraska
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey

New Mexico
New York
North
Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon

beyond a reasonable doubt.
LA. STAT. ANN. § 28:55(e)(1) (2016): clear & convincing
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B § 3864(6)(A) (2016): clear &
convincing
Commonwealth v. Nassar, 406 N.E.2d 1286 (Mass. 1980):
beyond a reasonable doubt
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1465 (West 2016): clear and
convincing
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.09(1) (West 2016): clear and
convincing
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-73(4) (2016): clear and convincing
MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.350 (West 2016): clear and
convincing
MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126(2) (West 2016): proof
beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to any physical
facts or evidence & clear & convincing evidence as to all
other matters; respondent’s mental disorder must be proved
to a reasonable medical certainty.
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-925(1) (West 2016): clear and
convincing
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 433A.310(1) (West 2016): clear
and convincing
In re B.T., 891 A.2d 1193 (N.H. 2006): clear and convincing
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30: 4-27.15 (West 2016); see also In re
Commitment of J.R., 916 A.2d 463 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2007): clear and convincing
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-11(C) (West 2016): clear and
convincing
N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Brian H., 857 N.Y.S.2d
530 (App. Div. 2008): clear and convincing
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-268(j) (2016): clear and convincing
evidence
In re B.D.K., 742 N.W.2d 41 (N.D. 2007): clear and
convincing
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15(C) (West 2016): clear and
convincing
OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 5-415(C) (2016): clear and
convincing
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 426.130 (West 2016): clear and
convincing
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50 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7304(f) (West 2016):
clear and convincing
40.1 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-8(J) (2016): clear and convincing
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-580 (2016): clear and convincing
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034(a) (West
2016): clear and convincing
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A –15– 631(10) (West 2016): clear
and convincing
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7616 (2016): clear and convincing
VA CODE ANN. § 37.2-817 (2016): clear and convincing
WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 71.05.310 (West 2016): clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence
W. VA. CODE, § 27-5-4(2) (West 2016): clear, cogent and
convincing proof.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(4)(e) (West 2016): clear and
convincing
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-110(j) (2016): clear and
convincing
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APPENDIX D: RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT EVALUATION
Alaska

Arizona

Colorado

Delaware

Florida
Illinois
Louisiana
Maine

Maryland

Massachusetts
Michigan

ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.745(e) (2016) Upon request by an
indigent respondent, the court shall appoint an independent
licensed physician or other mental health professional to
examine the respondent and testify on the respondent's
behalf. The court shall consider an indigent respondent's
request for a specific physician or mental health
professional.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-538 (2016): If unable to afford,
court shall appoint an independent evaluator acceptable to
patient from a list of practitioners
COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-65-127(4)(b) (2016) The court, upon
request of an indigent respondent or his attorney, shall
appoint, at the court's expense, one or more professional
persons of the respondent's selection to assist the
respondent in the preparation of his case.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5007(3) (2016) [right] to be
examined by an independent psychiatrist or other qualified
medical expert and to have such psychiatrist or other expert
testify as a witness on the individual's behalf, such witness
to be court appointed if the involuntary patient cannot
afford to retain such witness.
FLA. STAT. § 394.467(6)(a)(2) (West 2016): if cannot afford,
will be provided
405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-804 (West 2016): if cannot
afford one, court will arrange
LA. STAT. ANN. § 28:54(c)(2) (2016): Mental Health
Advocacy Service will pay if patient cannot afford
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 3864 1 (2016). (D) [shall
be notified of] (2) The patient's right to select or to have
the patient's attorney select an independent examiner”
Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F. Supp. 725 (D. Md. 1977): There
is no constitutional right to an independent psychiatric
examination at state expense in criminal proceedings; a
fortiori, similar principles should control in civil
commitment hearings involving an insanity acquittee.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123 § 5 (2016): right to present
independent testimony; court may provide if indigent
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1463 (West 2016): (1) If
requested before the first scheduled hearing or at the first
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scheduled hearing before the first witness has been sworn
on an application or petition, the subject of a
petition . . . has the right at his or her own expense, or if
indigent, at public expense , to secure an independent
clinical evaluation by a physician, psychiatrist, or licensed
psychologist of his or her choice relevant to whether he or
she requires treatment, whether he or she should be
hospitalized or receive treatment other than hospitalization,
and whether he or she is of legal capacity.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.07 9 (West 2016): 3. Examiners.
Prior to the hearing, the court shall inform the proposed
patient of the right to an independent second examination.
At the proposed patient's request, the court shall appoint a
second examiner of the patient's choosing to be paid for by
the county at a rate of compensation fixed by the court.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-118 (West 2016): (1) The
respondent, the respondent's attorney, or the friend of
respondent appointed by the court may secure a
professional person of the individual's own choice to
examine the respondent and to testify at the hearing before
the court or jury as to the results of the professional
person's examination. (2) If the person wishing to secure
the testimony of a professional person is unable to do so
because of financial reasons and if the respondent joins in
the request for the examination, the court shall appoint a
professional person other than the professional person
requesting the commitment to perform the examination.
Whenever possible, the court shall allow the respondent a
reasonable choice of an available professional person
qualified to perform the requested examination who will be
compensated from the public funds of the county where the
respondent resides.
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-908 (West 2016): provided if
indigent (limited to one evaluation)
In re Gannon, 301 A.2d 493 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1973): In
proceeding for commitment to psychiatric hospital, due
process includes right to independent psychiatric
examination, paid for by the county, but patient does not
get to choose the examiner, who is selected by the Court.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-11(B) (West 2016): At the hearing,
the client shall be represented by counsel and shall have the
right to present evidence on the client's behalf, including
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North Dakota
Ohio
Oregon

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

South
Carolina

South Dakota

Texas

Vermont

testimony by an independent mental health professional of
the client's own choosing
N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-02 (2016): provided for indigent
patients
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (West 2016): Right to
paid independent examiner if indigent
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 426.110(1) (West 2016): The judge
shall appoint one qualified examiner. If requested, the
judge shall appoint one additional qualified examiner. A
request for an additional examiner under this subsection
must be made in writing and must be made by the person
alleged to have a mental illness or the attorney for the
person.
Dixon v. Attorney Gen. of Pa., 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D.
Pa. 1971) (“The Secretary of Public Welfare, the
Commissioner of Mental Health, and the Attorney General
and their representatives and successors will assure that any
new involuntary proceedings for members of the present
class of plaintiffs will be in accordance with the following
principles: . . . 2) The subject thereof shall be entitled to
independent expert examination and assistance in
preparation for the hearing, through court appointment
where the subject cannot afford to retain these services.
Communications between the subject and the expert
described herein shall be privileged.”)
40.1 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-8 (2016): expert of choice and if
cannot afford one, court may, upon application, allow a
reasonable fee for one
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-530 (2016): must be given
opportunity to request additional exam by independent
examiner. If indigent, exam must be conducted at public
expense.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-12-3.14 (2016): notice of
hearing shall include . . . (3) Notice of the person's right to
seek an opinion of an independent psychiatrist at the
person's own expense or at the expense of the person's
county of residence if the person is indigent.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.010 (West
2016): court may order independent evaluation chosen by
patient if it determines evaluation will assist the fact finder
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7113 (2016): Whenever a court
orders an independent examination by a mental health
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professional or a qualified developmental disabilities
professional pursuant to this title or 13 V.S.A. § 4822, the
cost of the examination shall be paid by the Department of
Disabilities, Aging, and Independent Living or of Health.
The mental health professional or qualified developmental
disabilities professional may be selected by the court but the
Commissioner of Disabilities, Aging, and Independent
Living or of Mental Health may adopt a reasonable fee
schedule for examination, reports, and testimony.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7614 (2016): As soon as practicable
after notice of the commencement of proceedings is given,
the court on its own motion or upon the motion of the
proposed patient or his or her attorney or the state of
Vermont shall authorize examination of the proposed
patient by a psychiatrist other than the physician making
the original certification. The examination and subsequent
report or reports shall be paid for by the state of Vermont.
The physician shall report his or her finding to the party
requesting the report or to the court if it requested the
examination.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.360 (West 2016): (12)
independent expert will be public cost if patient cannot
afford
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-4 (West 2016): (h)(3) right to
independent expert, paid if patient indigent
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(9)(a) (West 2016): 3. If requested
by the subject individual, the individual's attorney, or any
other interested party with court permission, the individual
has a right at his or her own expense or, if indigent and with
approval of the court hearing the petition, at the reasonable
expense of the individual's county of legal residence, to
secure an additional medical or psychological examination
and to offer the evaluator's personal testimony as evidence
at the hearing.
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APPENDIX E: GUARDIAN MENTAL HEALTH CARE DECISION
STATUTES
Alabama

Alaska

Arizona

Arkansas

California

Colorado

ALA. CODE § 26-2A-108 (2016): No express statutory
language limiting or allowing mental health admissions;
says that guardians appointed under this statute have the
same powers, duties, and responsibilities as guardians for
minors. Guardians for minors may consent to medical or
other professional care or treatment of the ward.
ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.316(e) (2016): A guardian may
not: (1) place the ward in a facility or institution for the
mentally ill other than through a formal commitment
proceeding under AS47.30 in which the ward has a
separate guardian ad litem
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5312.01 (2016): (B) On
clear and convincing evidence that the ward is
incapacitated as a result of a mental disorder . . . and is
likely to be in need of inpatient mental health care and
treatment . . . court may authorize a guardian appointed
pursuant to this title to give consent for the ward to
receive inpatient mental health care. (C) The court shall
limit the guardian’s authority to what is reasonably
necessary to obtain the care required for the ward in the
least restrictive treatment alternative. (D) Within 48
hours after placement of the ward . . . the guardian shall
give notice of this action to the ward’s attorney . . . If
requested by the attorney, the court shall hold a hearing
on the appropriateness of the placement within 3 days
after receiving that request
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-303(a)(1) (2016): The
Guardian must petition the court to get permission to
commit the ward to a state hospital.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 2356(a) (West 2016): No ward or
conservatee may be placed in a mental health treatment
facility under this division against the will of the ward or
conservatee. [Requires compliance with the mental
health commitment statute.]
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-316 (2016): (4) A
guardian may not initiate the commitment of a ward to a
mental health care institution or facility except in
accordance with the state’s procedure for involuntary
civil commitment.
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CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-656(d) (West 2016):
Conservator of the person shall not have the power or
authority to cause the respondent to be committed to
any institution for the treatment of the mentally ill
except under the provisions of [mental health
commitment laws].
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3922 (2016): (b) the guardian
of the person has the following powers and duties:
(1) . . . the guardian may not waive any right of the
disabled person respecting involuntary commitment to
any facility for the treatment of mental illness or
deficiency.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2047.01 (2016): A guardian shall
not have the power: . . . (4) To consent to the involuntary
or voluntary civil commitment of an incapacitated
individual who is alleged to be mentally ill and
dangerous under any provision or proceeding occurring
under [D.C. statute].
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3215 (West 2016): (3) Rights that
may be removed from a person by an order determining
incapacity and which may be delegated to the guardian
include the right . . . (f) To consent to medical and
mental health treatment. . . . (4) Without first obtaining
specific authority from the court, as described in §
744.3725, a guardian may not: (a) Commit the ward to a
facility, institution, or licensed service provider without
formal placement proceeding, pursuant to chapter 393,
chapter 394, or chapter 397.
GA. CODE ANN. § 29-4-23 (2016): (a) Unless inconsistent
with the terms of any court order relating to the
guardianship, a guardian may: . . . (2) Subject to chs. 9,
20, and 36 of Title 31 and any other pertinent law, give
any consents or approvals that may be necessary for
medical or other professional care, counsel, treatment,
or service for the ward.
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:5-316(d) (West 2016): A
guardian shall not initiate the commitment of a ward to a
mental health-care institution except in accordance with
the State’s procedure for involuntary civil commitment.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-312 (2016): (1) the guardian
has the following powers and duties: . . . (c) A guardian
may give any consents or approvals that may be
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Illinois

Indiana

Iowa

Kansas

necessary to enable the ward to receive medical or other
professional care, counsel, treatment or service. . . . (e)
Any individual who lacks capacity to make informed
decisions about treatment upon application of the
individual’s guardian; provided that admission to an
inpatient facility shall require a recommendation for
admission by a designated examiner . . .
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11a-17 (West 2016):
(a) . . . A guardian of the person may not admit a ward to
a mental health facility except at the ward’s request as
provided in Article IV of the Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Code and unless the ward
has the capacity to consent to such admission as
provided in Article IV of the Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Code.
IND. CODE. ANN. § 29-3-8-2 (West 2016): (b) The
guardian (other than a temporary guardian) of an
incapacitated person has all of the powers to perform the
guardian’s responsibilities, including the powers with
respect to the incapacitated person and the incapacitated
person’s property regardless of where the property is
located, that are granted to the guardian of a minor
enumerated in subsection (a)(1) through (a)(9).
(including (a)(4), which provides: “The power to consent
to medical or other professional care and treatment for
the minor’s health and welfare.”)
IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.635 (West 2016): (1) Based
upon the evidence produced at the hearing, court may
grant a guardian the following powers and duties which
may be exercised without prior court approval: . . . (e)
Ensuring the ward receives professional care, counseling,
treatment, or services as needed. If necessitated by the
physical or mental disability of the ward, the provision of
professional care, counseling, treatment, or services
limited to the provision of routine physical and dental
examinations and procedures under anesthesia is
included, if the anesthesia is provided within the scope of
the health care practitioner’s scope of practice
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3075 (West 2016): (e) A guardian
shall not have the power . . . (9) to place the ward in a
treatment facility as defined in K.S.A. 59-3077, and
amendments thereto, except if authorized by the court as
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provided or therein [the referenced statute defines
treatment facility as, among other things, any psychiatric
or mental facility].
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387.660 (West 2016): Guardian
of a disabled person shall have the following powers and
duties, except as modified by order of the court: (1) To
give any necessary consent or approval to enable the
ward to receive medical or other professional care,
counsel, treatment or service.
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4566 (2016): H. Neither
a curator nor a court shall admit or commit an interdict
to a mental health treatment facility except in
accordance with the provisions of R.S. 28:50 through 64.
[mental health commitment statutes]
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-312 (2016): (a) . . . a
guardian has the following powers and duties, except as
modified by order of the court: (1) To the extent that it is
consistent with the terms of any order by a court of
competent jurisdiction relating to detention or
commitment of the ward, he is entitled to custody of the
person of his ward and may establish the ward’s place of
abode within or without this State, and may place the

ward in any hospital or other institution for care in the
same manner as otherwise provided by law (emphasis
Maryland

Massachusetts

Michigan

added)
MD. CODE. ANN., EST. & TRUSTS, § 13-708(b)(2) (West
2016): The right to custody of the disabled person and to
establish his place of abode within and without the State,
provided there is court authorization for any change in
the classification of abode, except that no one may be
committed to a mental facility without an involuntary
commitment proceeding as provided by law
MASS. GEN. LAW. ANN. ch. 190B § 5-309(f)(2016): No
guardian shall be given the authority under this chapter
to admit or commit an incapacitated person to a mental
health facility or a mental retardation facility
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5314 (West 2016): the
guardian has all of the following powers and duties, to
the extent granted by court order: . . . (c) The power to
give the consent or approval that is necessary to enable
the ward to receive medical or other professional care,
counsel, treatment, or service.
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Minnesota

Mississippi
Missouri

Montana

Nevada

New Hampshire

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.5-315(c) (West 2016): guardian
may not initiate the commitment of ward to an
institution except in accordance with § 524.5-313.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-213 (2016): No express
language limiting or allowing mental health admissions
MO. STAT. ANN. § 475.120(5) (West 2016): No guardian
of the person shall have authority to seek admission of
the guardian’s ward to a mental health or mental
retardation facility for more than thirty days for any
purpose without court order except as otherwise
provided by law.
MO. STAT. ANN. § 475.121(1) (West 2016): Pursuant to
an application alleging that the admission of the ward to
a particular mental health or mental retardation facility
is appropriate and in the best interest of the ward, the
court may authorize . . . to admit the ward. Such
application shall be accompanied by a physician’s
statement setting forth the factual basis for the need for
continued admission including a statement of the ward’s
current diagnosis, plan of care, treatment or habilitation
and the probable duration of the admission.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-321 (West 2016): (2) [A] full
guardian has the following powers and duties, except as
limited by order of the court: . . . (c) A full guardian may
give any consents or approvals that may be necessary to
enable the ward to receive medical or other professional
care, counsel, treatment, or service.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.079 (West 2016): 1. . . . a
guardian of the person . . . shall perform the duties
necessary for the proper care, maintenance, education
and support of the ward, including, without limitation,
the following: . . . (c) Authorizing medical, surgical,
dental, psychiatric, psychological, hygienic or other
remedial care & treatment for the ward.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25 (2016): (I)(a) [T]he
guardian shall be entitled to custody of the ward and
may establish the ward’s place of abode within or
without this state. Admission to a state institution shall
be in accordance with the following: . . . (2) . . . without
prior approval . . . upon written certification by a
physician licensed in the state of New Hampshire, or, in
the case of placement in New Hampshire hospital, by a
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psychiatrist
licensed
in
the
state
of
New
Hampshire, . . . that the placement is in the ward’s best
interest and is the least restrictive placement available.
Within 36 hours, excluding days when the court is closed,
of such an admission of a ward to a state institution, the
guardian shall submit [notice and rationale for the
admission], together with a copy of the certificate by the
physician or psychiatrist.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:12-56 (West 2016): (d) . . . if the
ward objects to the initiation of voluntary admission for
psychiatric treatment or to the continuation of that
voluntary admission, the State’s procedures for
involuntary commitment pursuant to P.L.1987, c. 116
shall apply. If the ward objects to any other decision of
the guardian of the ward pursuant to this section, this
objection shall be brought to the attention of the
[Court], which may, in its discretion, appoint an attorney
or guardian ad litem for the ward, hold a hearing or
enter such orders as may be appropriate in
circumstances.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-6 (West 2016): C. Subject to
the provisions of A and B of this section, a health-care
decision made by a guardian for the protected person is
effective without judicial approval, if the appointing
court has expressly authorized the guardian to make
health-care decisions for the protected person, in
accordance with provisions of § 45-5-312 NMSA 1978,
after notice to the protected person and any agent.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.22 (McKinney 2016):
(b) No guardian may: 1. consent to voluntary formal or
informal admission of incapacitated person to a mental
hygiene facility under article 9 or 15 of this chapter
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35A-1241 (2016): (a)(2) The guardian
of the person may give any consent or approval that may
be necessary to enable the ward to receive medical, legal,
psychological, or other professional care, counsel,
treatment, or service
N.D. CENT. CODE. § 30.1-28-12 (5-312) (2016): 2. No
guardian may voluntarily admit a ward to a mental
health facility or state institution for a period of more
than forty-five days without a mental health commitment
proceeding or other court order . . . . Notwithstanding
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the other provisions of this subsection, the guardian may
readmit a ward to a mental health facility or a state
institution within sixty days of discharge from that
institution, if the original admission to the facility or
institution had been authorized by the court.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.13 (West 2016): (C) A
guardian of the person may authorize or approve the
provision to the ward of medical, health, or other
professional care, counsel, treatment, or services unless
the ward or an interested party files objections with the
probate court, or the court, by rule or order, provides
otherwise.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 3-119 (2016): 5. No guardian
shall have the power to consent on behalf of the ward to
placement of the ward in a facility or institution to which
a person without a guardian would have to be committed
pursuant to the laws of this state absent formal
commitment proceedings in which the ward has
independent counsel.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.320 (West 2016): (3) Before
a guardian may place an adult protected person in a
mental health treatment facility, a nursing home or other
residential facility, guardian must file a statement with
the court . . . guardian may thereafter place adult
protected person in a mental health treatment facility, a
nursing home or other residential facility without further
court order. If an objection is made . . . court shall
schedule hearing on objection as soon as practicable.
20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521 (West 2016):
(f) The court may not grant to a guardian powers
controlled by other statute, including, but not limited to,
power: (1) To admit incapacitated person to an inpatient
psychiatric facility or State center for the mentally
retarded.
33 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-29 (2016): No express
language limiting or allowing mental health admissions
S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-312 (2016): (3) A guardian may
give any consents or approvals that may be necessary to
enable the ward to receive medical or other professional
care, counsel, treatment, or service.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-40 (2016): A guardian of a
protected person shall make decisions regarding the
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protected person’s support, care, health, habilitation,
therapeutic treatment, and, if not inconsistent with an
order of commitment or custody, shall determine the
protected person’s residence.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-6-204 (2016): No express
language limiting or allowing mental health admissions
TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1151.051 (West 2016): (c) A
guardian of the person has: . . . (4) the power to consent
to medical, psychiatric, and surgical treatment other than
the inpatient psychiatric commitment of the ward
TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1151.053 (West 2016): (a) . . . a
guardian may not voluntarily admit a ward to a public or
private inpatient psychiatric facility operated by the
Department of State Health . . . If care and treatment in
a psychiatric or residential facility is necessary, the ward
or the ward’s guardian may: (1) apply for services under
Section 593.027 or 593.028, Health and Safety Code;
(2) apply to a court to commit the person under Subtitle
C or D, Title 7, Health and Safety Code, or Chapter 462,
Health and Safety Code; or (3) transport the ward to an
inpatient mental health facility for a preliminary
examination in accordance with Subchapters A and C,
Chapter 573, Health and Safety Code. . . . (c) A guardian
of a person may voluntarily admit an incapacitated
person to a residential care facility for emergency care or
respite care under Section 593.027 or 593.028, Health
and Safety Code
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-312 (West 2016): (b) A
guardian may give any consents or approvals that may be
necessary to enable the ward to receive medical or other
professional care, counsel, treatment, or service.
VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 14, § 3074 (2016): Nothing in this
chapter shall give the guardian of a ward authority
to: . . . (1) place that person in a state school or hospital
except pursuant to [mental commitment procedures]; (2)
consent to an involuntary treatment or medication
petition pursuant to chapter 181 of Title 18.
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-2019 (2016): No express language
limiting or allowing mental health admissions
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.92.043 (West 2016): (4) No
guardian, limited guardian, or standby guardian may
involuntarily commit for mental health treatment,
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West Virginia

Wisconsin

Wyoming

observation, or evaluation an alleged incapacitated
person who is unable or unwilling to give informed
consent to such commitment unless the procedures for
involuntary commitment . . . are followed
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-3-1 (West 2016): (a) The
guardian of a protected person owes a fiduciary duty to
the protected person and is responsible for obtaining
provision for and making decisions with respect to the
protected person’s support, care, health, habilitation,
education, therapeutic treatment, social interactions with
friends and family, and, if not inconsistent with an order
of commitment or custody, to determine the protected
person’s residence.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.25 (West 2016): (2)(d) Guardian
authority to exercise certain powers . . . n. The power to
apply for protective placement under s. 55.075 or for
commitment under s. 51.20 [involuntary commitment
statute] or 51.45(13) for the ward; see also State ex rel.
Watts v. Combined Cmty. Servs. Bd., 362 N.W.2d 104
(Wis. 1985) (holding that a guardian does not have the
statutory authority to consent to mental hospitalization
of his ward who is not protectively placed and who has
not consented to such hospitalization absent compliance
with requirements of mental health commitment statute
(§ 51.15 and this section)).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3-2-202 (2016): (a) Upon order of
the court, after notice and hearing and appointment of a
guardian ad litem, the guardian may: (i) Commit the
ward to a mental health hospital or other mental health
facility

